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Abstract: The transaction cost (TC) theory of the firm provides a conceptual model 
suitable for investigating the mechanism by which business firms evolve and grow. 
This paper uses poultry farm businesses (PFBs) in Tanzania as a vehicle of 
assessing relevance of the theory in explaining factors determining choice of 
institutional arrangement, for the purpose of identifying policy measures that can 
influence small business firms to opt for contractual businesses. A cross-sectional 
survey was conducted in two regions in the country covering 170 respondents. 
Logistic regression analysis indicate that the choice by business firms to opt for a 
particular institutional arrangement is determined by all the components of total 
transaction cost (TTC); as all were statistically significant (P < 0.05). It shows also 
that search and screening cost has greatest impact on choice of institutional 
arrangement (Wald = 8.745) followed by enforcement cost (Wald = 4.735) and 
negotiation cost (Wald = 4.735). It indicates in addition that, probability of PFBs to 
enter into contractual businesses falls with increase in Transaction Costs (TCs). 
Linear regression analysis shows, in addition that, search and screening cost has 
greatest elasticity to TTC (Beta = 0.596), followed by enforcement cost (Beta = 
0.43) and negotiation cost (Beta =0.437). A theory based intervention should 
therefore, mainly be focused on reducing search and screening cost, followed by the 
other components of TTC. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents empirical analysis of the factors determining choice of 
institutional arrangement by small business firms predominant in Tanzania and 
other developing countries.  It aims at investigating policy measures which can 
influence the business firms to shift from independent business entities operating in 
market institutional arrangement into contractual businesses.  The premises of this 
study is that formation of contractual business arrangement in forms of contract 
farming, vertical integration producers’ organization and the like results into growth 
of business firms into commercial businesses.  If the contractual business 
arrangement does not develop independently, the Government should therefore 
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intervene and stimulate them to develop. The study used poultry farm businesses 
(PFBs) in Tanzania in the investigation. Throughout this chapter, discussion is 
based on comparative institutional framework which is the basic feature of the 
transaction cost economics analysis. 
 
The first part of this paper provides a brief theoretical review on determinants of 
choice of institutional arrangements based on the transaction cost theory of the firm. 
The second part presents empirical analysis of factors determining choice of 
institutional arrangements by the farm businesses in the study area.  The third 
section presents in brief the methodology that was used in conducting the study.  
This was followed by empirical analysis of motives behind formation of each 
institutional arrangement. This section covered description of the dependent and 
independent variables, model specification and estimation and analysis.  The paper 
also presents analysis of the determinants of total transaction cost to investigate 
policy measures to stimulate growth of the poultry industry. This part also presents 
model specification, analysis and econometrics results. 
 
THEORETICAL REVIEW OF THE DETERMINANTS OF CHOICE OF 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT 
The central tenet of the transaction cost economics is that there are costs in any 
transaction regardless of whether it occurs in a market arrangement or in contractual 
business arrangements (including for example vertical integration, contract farming, 
joint venture and partnership). The choice between the two alternative arrangements 
may be considered by an example of a business firm deciding whether to outsource 
a production input in the market or otherwise.  The market option would see the 
firm purchasing the required input in the spot market, produce and sell output in the 
spot market (buy option); while the contractual business arrangement option would 
see the firm build its own plant to manufacture the input, produce and sell the 
product in its own sell outlets (make option) or entering into a joint venture with the 
input manufacturing firm to supply the input and market the output (collaborate 
option).  
 
In this case the business chooses the most efficient arrangement in the alternative 
options, the one which involve lowest costs. Similarly in transaction cost 
economics, efficiency, that is transaction cost (transaction risks) minimization is 
considered to play the central role in decisions; or more precisely it is seen as the 
primary determinant of choice of institutional arrangement. In the PFBs under 
analysis the market institutional arrangement ‘buy’ option and contractual business 
arrangement (make and collaborate) option may be conceptualized as shown in 
Table 1. 
 
According to the transaction cost theory of the firm, hierarchies and markets are 
alternative institutional arrangements and the choice between the two depends on 
magnitude of transaction cost/risk (Williamson, 2004). The magnitude of 
transaction risk is mainly determined by human behavioral assumptions (bounded 
rationality and opportunism) complimented with exchange attributes namely, asset 
specificity uncertainty and frequency (Williamson, 2000). 
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Table 1: The make versus  buy choice for FFBs 
Contractual business 
arrangement 




Hierarchy Hybrid Market 
Choice: Make (produce 
within the firm) 
Collaborate Buy (coordinate transaction in the 
market) 
Descriptive:  Firm develops its 
internal whole–
owned business  
Firm enter into 
contractual 
arrangements 
with other firms 
Businesses buy input and sell 
output in spot market 







Institutional environment determines also the choice of institutional arrangement by 
business firms. Figure 1 summarizes the determinants of magnitude of transaction 
costs and therefore of choice of institutional arrangement according to the 



















Figure 1: Determinants of magnitude of transaction cost 
Source:Adopted from Louise H. et al. (2008) 
 
When bounded rationality (inability of business firms to engage in contracts which 
takes into account every possible contingency) is high, business firms opt for 
contractual business arrangement to safeguard themselves against transaction risks 
involved in business deals with relatively unknown trading partners and unknown 
future business environment. In extreme cases of bounded rationality, business firms 
avoid the transaction risks by entering into contractual arrangement which control all 
the stages of the supply chain; that is produce within the firm. Conversely when 
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future contingencies are relatively easy to predict; and therefore relatively cheaper to 
‘buy’ than to produce within the firm. Hybrid arrangement occurs, therefore, in 
moderate levels of bounded rationality as it allows firms to have some flexibility for 
future contingencies.  
 
When human opportunism (potential of one contracting party to take advantage of 
the other) is high, businesses opt for contractual business arrangement as it 
eliminates possibilities of external parties to deceive or cheat. On the other side, 
when opportunism is low, businesses opt for market institutional arrangement 
because there are no risks of external parties to act contrary to agreements made 
between contracting parties - or more precisely it makes relatively expensive for the 
businesses to produce within the firm than coordinating transaction in the market. 
Hybrid arrangement occurs, therefore, in cases of moderate levels of opportunism.  
 
In the case of investment, when asset specificity (the extent to which transactions 
are supported by specialized assets) is high businesses opt for contractual business 
arrangement where in extreme cases the firms opt for an arrangement which 
controls the entire supply chain, the hierarchy. This is because whenever assets 
becomes more specific, businesses become subjected to a hold-up problem; in 
Alchian’s (1978) words, the costs of hiring increase more than that of producing 
within the firm. The basic idea is that the business firm appears in a situation where 
it cannot draw up good contracts; and therefore it becomes important to allocate 
power (Hart, 1997); that is, enter into an arrangement which control the entire 
supply chain. On the other hand, therefore, when asset specificity is low business 
firms opt for market institutional arrangement as costs of producing within the firm 
become relatively greater than buying in the market. This is because transaction in 
the market arrangement does not involve costs of contracting and yet the hold-up 
threat is reduced or eliminated. With moderate asset specificity therefore, the 
businesses opts for hybrid arrangement. Williamson (1991) pose a model that 
relates the degree of asset specificity to forms of institutional business arrangements 















Figure 2: Institutional arrangements (IA) and asset specificity model 
Source: Williamson (1991) 
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The model predicts that hierarchy arrangement is preferred to market and hybrid 
arrangements in situations of very high asset specificity, while market arrangement 
is preferred to hybrid and hierarchy arrangements in situations of low asset 
specificity, and hybrid arrangement is preferred to hierarchy and market 
arrangements when asset specificity is at intermediate levels.  
 
Another dimension to be considered in the analysis of factors that determine choice 
of institutional arrangement is uncertainty (that is, it is impossible to foresee future 
events such that contractual arrangements cannot ex-ante establish price, delivery 
dates, quality and acceptance of the goods negotiated). When uncertainty is low, 
elaboration of contracts relatively complete is possible and therefore firms opt for 
market institutional arrangement because it becomes relatively cheaper than 
producing within the firm. When face high uncertainty, on the other hand 
businesses favor contractual arrangements or in extreme cases control the entire 
supply chain. This is due to the fact that business firms in this arrangement have 
ability to adapt to the future business environment without opportunistic haggling 
from its trading partners; and more specifically costs of buying in the market 
become relatively greater than that of making within the firm. Putting asset 
specificity and uncertainty attributes together, Williamson argues that firms are 
preferred to markets and hybrids in situations of very high asset specificity and 
uncertainty, and markets to hybrids in situation of low asset specificity and low 
uncertainty, with hybrids optimal when both asset specificity and uncertainty are at 
intermediate levels (Williamson, 1991).  
 
The other factor which determines choice of institutional arrangement by business 
firms is frequency of transactions. When frequency is high business firms opt for 
contractual arrangements. This is because with high transaction frequency - a clear 
understanding between the trading partners, is required to ensure a desirable 
performance, and thus requires a written agreement. High frequency provides 
incentive for a firm to control the entire supply chain. This is because the overhead 
costs of the hierarchical institutional arrangement are easier to be recovered to 
recurring transactions (Williamson, 1985);  it eliminates chances of opportunism; 
and it also, makes possible for the businesses to tape economies of scale  (efficient 
use of capacity). Occasional transactions can, on the other hand be outsourced to 
external parties as costs resulting from opportunism are relatively lower than when 
production is done within the firm. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Design and Sample 
This study used a cross-sectional design and was conducted in Dar es Salaam and 
Singida regions in Tanzania between January 2011 and March 2011. The two 
regions were selected due to a number of reasons.   Firstly, both regions have formal 
and informal contract PFBs (informal contracts are in forms of agglomerations of 
poultry businesses producing and distributing poultry products). Secondly, Dar es 
Salaam region is a potential market for poultry produces (in forms of hotels, bars, 
restaurants and many other consumers) and it is a potential producer of exotic 
poultry birds. Thirdly Singinda region, is one among the potential producers of 
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traditional poultry stock in the country. The study employed binary logistic 
regression and linear regression methods. The analysis was based on information 
gathered from a sample of 170 respondents. Out of the total respondents, 128 (75%) 
were individual business entities operating in market institutional arrangement 
referred to in this paper as institutional arrangement 1 (IA1); and 25 percent were 
contractual business arrangement (including partnerships, women groups, contract 
farming and the like) referred to in this paper as institutional arrangement 2 (IA2).   
 
Empirical analysis of the determinants of choice of institutional arrangement 
in the PFBs 
The analysis employed binary regression model in investigating the determinants of 
choice of institutional arrangement. It involved predicting factors which determine 
PFBs to opt for market institutional arrangement or otherwise (that is, opt for 
contractual business arrangement), a case of dichotomous choice. In this case the 
probability of a business firm to opt for market institutional arrangement took the 
value 1; and value 0 with the probability of not opting for market institutional 
arrangement. Probabilities of all the alternatives therefore, add to 1. A variety of 
statistical models can be used to establish relationships between dependent and 
determining factors in research. Linear regression method is the popular tool of 
analysis used in this kind of studies as it is easy to apply and interpret. It was 
however, found to be inappropriate for this study because it has a number of 
limitations such as: (a) It may generate predicted values outside the 0 – 1 intervals 
and violate the basic tenet of probability (b) The variance of the disturbance term in 
this model is heteroschedastic implying that error term is the function of dependent 
variable; and therefore violate another assumption of regression theory and (c) The 
assumption of normality in the disturbance term in linear regression analysis is not 
justifiable as the error term is not normally distributed because probability takes 
only two values; violating yet another assumption of regression theory. These 
limitations prompted the use of a non–linear regression model. 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this analysis was the choice of institutional arrangement 
(CIA), defined as the probability of PFBs to opt for market institutional 
arrangement or otherwise. Thus the CIA was measured as a dichotomous variable 
with two categories: opting for continue operating market institutional arrangement 




The model had three independent variables namely search and screening cost, 
negotiation cost; and monitoring and enforcement cost (the components of total 
transaction cost).  
 
Search and screening cost (SEARCHTOTAL) 
This is the cost incurred to obtain information about reliability and trustworthiness 
of potential trading partners. The cost includes opportunity cost on time spent in the 
search and screening exercise and financial expenditure on phone calls and 
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advertisement. The financial expenditure includes also travel expenses in terms of 
bus and taxi fares, meals and accommodation on visits to the potential trading 
partners. It includes in addition, hiring selling stalls, payments made for Local 
Authority levy and business permit. The costs per production cycle in the sample 
area are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Search and screening cost 
Transaction costs N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Search and screening costs (Tshs)  170 0.00 78,875.00 5,383.00 
Search and screening time (hours) 170 992.00 33.5 3.14 
Search and screening time in money 
terms (Shs 750.00 @ hour)a 
 
170 1500.00 25,125.00 32,300.00 
Total search and screening costs (Tshs) 170 1500.00 104,000.00 24,222.00 
 
a Minimum wage rate in Tanzania is Tshs 180,000.00 per month; that is Tshs 
6,000.00 per day (and thus value of time spent per hour was taken as Tshs 750.00 
equivalent to US $ 0.499). 
 
The mean SEARCHTOTAL in the study area is Tshs 24,322.00 (about US $ 16.2) 
with maximum value of Tshs 104,000.00 (about US $ 69.3) and minimum of Tshs 
1,200.00 (about US $ 0.8). The main component of SEARCHTOTAL is financial 
expenditure, but opportunity cost of time spent by producers waiting for buyers in 
market places contributes also to the cost. Time spent for this purpose is 
significantly high in villages and may sometimes reach up to five working days 
(33.5 hours) in some of the surveyed area.  
 
Negotiation cost (NEGOTOTAL) 
This is the cost incurred to facilitate negotiations for the terms of sale and breaking 
a deal. The cost includes financial expenditure on (legal) advice on arbitration and 
setting safeguards against misuse of the agreements. The safeguards in terms of 
agreements may be put into formal (written) or informal (verbal) contracts. The 
costs includes also: opportunity cost of time spent on bargaining and negotiating, 
costs on visits to possible traders/customers in terms of expenditure on transport, 
meals and accommodation during visits to potential buyers. The cost may include 
also: payments to negotiators if done by an agent, meals, allowances during 
negotiation meetings, bribery and other forms of legitimate and illegitimate 
payments to smoothen the negotiation process. Table 3 depict a summary of 
negotiation costs. 
 
The mean NEGOTOTAL in the study area is Tshs 20,309.00 (about US $ 13.5) 
with maximum value of Tshs 97,500.00 (about US $ 64.9) and minimum value Tshs 
1,500.00 (about US $ 0.99). It indicates therefore that at least every PFB incurs 
some costs in negotiating sale price and sometime the cost may be very high. 
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Table 3: Negotiation cost 
Transaction costs N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Negotiation time (hours) 170  1 130.00 27.00 
Negotiation time  in money terms 
(Tshs 750@hour) 
170    0 0 0.00 
Transaction total negotiation costs 
(Tshs) 
170    750.00 97,500.00 20,309.00 
 
Contract monitoring and enforcement cost (ENFORCETOTAL) 
This is a cost incurred to keep track of performance of contract implementation in 
order to reduce possibility of breach of agreement. In credit sale agreements (formal 
or informal), the seller is forced to make regular inspections at various intervals of 
marketing. This is made to ensure that the creditor does not engage into strategic 
default or behave contrary to the agreements. In the present study, for example, 
respondent indicated that it is necessary to inspect the product in order to ensure 
that the birds do not lose weight or die of disease attacks or from any other reason. 
In addition, the seller incurs contract enforcement costs to ensure that, the creditor 
pays in time; and takes appropriate action (often through the legal system) in events 
of delay payment or default. The costs includes therefore: payments related to legal 
filling of cases, levies to relevant institutions including police force, courts, and 
local government authorities. The costs may as well be payments to a third party 
commissioned to enforce the contract on behalf of the seller. It may also be 
expenditure incurred to maintain good relationship with the creditor in forms of 
phone calls, visits, gifts and other legitimate and illegitimate payments made to 
ensure smooth enforcement of the contract. The costs per production cycle in the 
sample area are summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Monitoring and enforcement cost 
Transaction costs N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Number of visits 169  1.00 7.00    1.426           
Costs of visits 169   500.00          12,000.00  2797.60        
Agent cost  169  100.00                    14,200.00 1,275.70 
Transaction total enforcement costs 169  1000.00 14,200.00 7,581.10 
 
The estimated mean ENFORCETOTAL in the study area was Tshs 7,581.00 (about 
US $ 5.1) with maximum value of Tshs 142,000.00 (about US $ 94.7) and 
minimum value of Tshs 1,000.00 (about US $ 0.67). The mean, maximum and 
minimum values of SEARCHTOTAL, NEGOTOTAL and ENFORCETOTAL 
show that, at least every PFB incurs transaction costs which may be too high to be 
neglected as it is in neo-classical economics. In addition to the monetary transaction 
costs, the seller may incur non-monetary transaction costs, which in North’s (1986) 
literature are referred to as ‘non marketed transaction costs’. The costs include: 
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unanticipated shocks, embarrassments and frustrations which business actors do 
suffer during the exchange process. The costs have a great impact in discouraging 
businesses to produce and therefore, inhibit growth.  In-depth views of most of the 
informants in the study area on the non market transaction costs may be 
summarized as: 
‘... in PFB, it is difficult to get an honest customer, negotiate and 
successfully sell the birds. In first place, when the chicken birds reach 
harvest time thieves gets chance of entering the farmers premises on pretext 
of window shopping of the birds but end up stealing some of personal 
belongings of the farmer – poultry farming is perceived by some people as 
an invitation of thieves to their homes. Secondly, in some incidences, 
particularly when the farmer is not careful in counting during the exchange 
exercise, dishonest buyers usually do squeeze two or three birds at a go and 
show that it is only one bird. Yet the customers visiting the farms may be 
transmitters of dangerous poultry  diseases – including those which can kill 
all the birds in a shed in one or two days’.    
 
Model Specification and Estimation 
In theory, the decision by business firms on whether to remain operating as 
independent business entities in market institutional arrangement or enter into 
contractual arrangements is a discrete binary choice, which depends on magnitude 
of utility (transaction costs economizing potential). In this case the dependent 
variable is an indicator of whether or not a business enters a particular institutional 
arrangement. Let Ua and Ub represent a firm’s utility of the two choices that is, 
remain operating as independent business entity in market institutional arrangement 
or entering into contractual business arrangements respectively. The firm’s utility 
for each choice is unobservable but firms reveals their preferences by choosing the 




Where: X1 = Search and screening cost 
           X2 = Negotiation cost 
            X3= Monitoring and enforcement cost 
           βa Β0 and βbΒ0 = intercepts 
uaandub  = Stochastic elements  
 
The determinant of choice between the two alternatives is revelation of ranking of 
preferences the firm makes. Thus when Ua> Ub that is;(βa Β0 +βa Β1X1 + βa Β2 X2 + βa 
Β3 X3 + ua)> (βbΒ0 + + βbΒ1 X1  + βbΒ2X2   + βbΒ3 X3 + ub) the firm chooses to 
remain operating as independent business entity in market institutional arrangement; 
and chooses to enter into contractual business entity arrangement if the opposite is 
true.  
 
The commonly used analytical techniques when the dependent variable is 
dichotomous are binary logit and probit models. In principle the two models are 
indistinguishable from each other except that logit has fatter tails (Gujarati, 2003). 
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The choice of whether to employ probit or logit regression analysis is largely of 
one’s convenience and conversion, since the substantive result are indistinguishable 
(Long, 1997). The probit model was not an option in the present study because of 
nature of variables used as it assumed cumulative normal distribution. The logistic 
regression model was preferred because it is in addition computationally simple. 
The probability that a PFB chooses to remain operating as an independent business 
entity or otherwise is therefore determined by solving a logistic regression function. 
The regression function in the present study is defined as:  
 
Where:  PB= Probability of a PFB remaining operating as independent business 
entity.  
Z = Measure of total contribution of all independent variables used in the 
model, often referred to as the logit.  Larger values of Z, corresponds 
therefore to greater probability of opting for remaining operating as 
independent business entity. It is therefore a set of independent variables 
defined in the current study as: 
 
     Where:   Β0 = Intercept  
              X1 = Search and screening cost 
               X2 = Negotiation cost 
               X3 = Monitoring and enforcement cost 
Equation (4) can therefore be rewritten as: 
 
Survey data collected in the study area were used to estimate equations (4) and (5). 
Table 5 present descriptive statistics for values of X1, X2 and X3 the inputs for the 
binary logistic regression analysis.  The logistic model was then estimated using 
SPSS windows software. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for transaction costs 
Variable N Definition Descriptive Statistic 
Institutional arrangement 1 127 Probability for opting for 
IA1 
1 = IA1;   0 = Otherwise 
1= 127 observations 
0 = 43 observations  
Search and screening cost (X1) 170 Total searching and 









Enforcement cost (X3) 169 Total monitoring & 
enforcement costs (TShs) 
Min = 1,000.00
Max = 14,200.00
Mean =  7,581.10
 
The descriptive statistics show in general that, total transaction cost per cycle is too 
high to be neglected when computing total costas it is with neo classical economics 
when determining total costs.In comparison with price of chicken birds (TShs 
5,000.00 per bird on average which is about US $ 3.3)) for example, the mean 
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search and screening cost (Tshs 24,332.00 (about US $ 16.2)) is equivalent to about 
five birds. Similarly, the mean value for negotiation cost is equivalent to about four 
birds, and it is about two birds for monitoring cost. It can therefore be concluded 
that, for the poultry birds to reach the consumers in one production cycle, about 
Tshs 55,000.00 (about 11 birds  equivalent to about US $ 36.7) is spent as cost of 
participating in the market. This is a substantial amount of money income to a 
farmer and may have great impact on de-motivating production. The amount may 
sometimes be even greater depending on different factors including for example, 
geographical distance to the market and thin demand for the poultry harvest. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Binary Logistic Regression Analysis Output 
The logistic regression analysis was interpreted based on Wald statistics. The 
regression output for the model is depicted in Table 6.The regression results 
presents the following: relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables, impact of the independent variable on choice of institutional arrangement, 
and the relative contribution of each independent variable on the dependent 
variable.  
 
Table 6: Binary logistic regression output 
Variables in the model B S.E. Wald Df Sig. 
SEARCHTOTAL 4.300 1.450 8.744786 1 0.003105 
NEGOTMSHS 4.580 2.240 4.195447 1 0.040533 
ENFORCETOTAL 7.470 3.430 4.735357 1 0.029549 
Constant -2.350 0.6758 12.09902 1 0.000504 
Hosmer- Lemeshow  =  0.962  
Nagelkerke R2              =    0.22  
 
The indices of goodness-of-fit show that the model adequately fits the data as 
indicated by Hosmer- Lemeshow statistics (>0.05) and Nagelkerke squared (= 
0.22). In addition all the variables in the logistic regression model are statistically 
significant (<0.05) confirming that the estimated coefficients are reliable values of 
the parameters for the model.  All the computed Wald coefficients in the model are 
statistically significant (P < 0.05) suggesting that the decision to opt for IA1 or 
otherwise is influenced by simultaneous interaction of all the three components of 
transaction cost (NEGOTMSHS, NEGOTOTAL and ENFORCETOTAL). The 
regression output shows also that all the independent variables are positively related 
to the dependent variable, implying that, probability of the business firmsto opt for 
market institutional arrangement increases as transaction cost increases. The Wald 
parameters show in addition that, search and screening cost is the greatest 
determinant of the firms’ choice of institutional arrangement.  
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The positive relationship between the independent variable and choice for market 
institutional arrangement shows that, an increase in transaction risks prompts 
business firms to opt for market institutional arrangement rather than contractual 
business arrangement. This provides an explanation on why most of the PFBs are 
independent business entities operating in market institutional arrangement. The 
factors which are likely to motivate PFBs to opt for IA1 rather than IA2 are 
summarized in the subsequent sections. 
 
Inadequate Legal Protection  
The institutional environment for PFBs in the country is generally very weak as 
investors are not well protected by legal institutions (World Bank, 2011). The 
institutions are not functioning properly to an extent that business firms rarely use 
police and courts to solve business problems. The legal system is perceived, for 
example by some of the respondents who participated in this study as being both 
expensive and subject to manipulation because it can be bribed. It is also perceived 
by most of the respondents that court rulings are helpless as in most cases the 
creditors are poor and do not have enough assets that can be seized for 
compensation in case of default or any other kind of dishonest. In order to avoid the 
transaction risks resulting from inability of legal institutions to adequately protect 
businesses in cases of contract disputes the farm businesses choose to opt for IA1.  
 
High Opportunistic Behavior 
The business actors in the study area are characterized by high opportunistic 
behaviour. In rating the degree of trustworthiness among business actors in the 
study area, most of the respondents indicated that, trustworthiness is very low. 
Similar conclusion is also made by Fatchamps (2004) indicating that, business firms 
in Africa are in general unreliable and optimistic; they usually delay payments, calls 
for contract renegotiation and characterized by high rate of default. In such a 
situation where there is low trustworthiness among business actors, and the ‘rules of 
the game’ are not properly functioning, firms opt for market institutional 
arrangement so as to avoid transaction risks that may occur from opportunistic 
breaches by business partners.  
 
Perishability of Poultry Products 
The PFBs are also prone to high uncertainty resulting from perishable nature 
(temporal asset specificity) of the poultry harvests. Poultry products need a constant 
follow up of sales and prompt search for alternative outlets in case the intended 
buyer declines the deal. The problem of low trustworthiness makes it difficult and 
costly to monitor behaviour of a business partner(s) or sales representatives; more 
precisely it involves high agency costs.  
 
The main cause of the costs is prevalence of information asymmetry especially in 
the rural society. A farmer, for example in remote area in Singinda, who sells to Dar 
es Salaam consumers is not well informed on the day-to-day condition of the 
market; and as a result cannot effectively monitor behaviour of the business partner 
or agent. In such circumstances the business firms opt for IA1 in order to avoid 
transaction risks resulting from both environmental and behaviour uncertainty. 
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Fear of Free Rider Problem 
The PFB actors are in fear of transaction risks resulting from human behaviour of 
working less harder when in groups than when working alone. The phenomenon is 
consistent with the theory of social loafing in social psychology and ‘free-rider’ 
theoryin the orthodox economics.  Since the firms cannot institute a mechanism to 
control this behaviour, business actors choose to remain operating as independent 
business entities in fear of transaction risk resulting from this problem. The 
informants’ views in the study area on this problem may be summarized as: 
 ‘In nature most of the people works less hard when are in group businesses 
(including for example partnerships, cooperative, women groups and in 
other contractual arrangements) than when they are alone due to a number 
of reasons. Firstly, people puts less effort in contractual businesses in 
poultry farming because they are in most cases engaged in other farm or 
non farm income generating activities like civil service, crop production 
and large animal (cattle and goat) livestock keeping as their main 
employment; they undertakes PFB as a part time business activity. 
Secondly, there is tendency for one or two members of contractual 
arrangements to portray in front of the society that they personally own or 
control the business; and as such the other members remains unnoticed and 
therefore cannot benefit successes in terms of respect which the firm earns 
from the society. Thirdly, it is difficult to control plans of the business 
because each of the business members has his own inclination; and hopes 
that most of the work will be done by other members. Fourthly, people fear 
the problem of unequal distribution of costs and profit as in most cases the 
farmers are unable to draw good contracts on group businesses.’ 
 
The regression output shows also that search and screening cost (Wald = 8.744) is 
the greatest contributing factor for the PFBs to opt for IA1 followed by monitoring 
and enforcement cost (Wald = 3.430) and negotiation costs (Wald = 2.240).  
The following are some of the explanations on why search and screening cost is 
greatest contributing factor which motivates PFBs to opt for IA1: 
 
Lack of Business Experience 
Most of the PFBs do not have enough business experience. The respondents in the 
surveyed area indicated, for example, that only 38 percent had more than four years 
experience in business while the rest 52 percent are new in business and therefore 
do not have enough entrepreneurial skills to get reputable business partners. In such 
a situation the firms are for example not able to easily identify reliable trading 
partners and can easily be deceived in business. 
 
Lack of Trust 
Most of the business partners are not honest by nature and are likely to work less 
hard in search for buyers because they may be busy with some other personal 
businesses. They may as well wish to benefit from the business at expense of other 
members of the contractual arrangement by for example inflating sale price in order 
to pocket the difference. They may even report deflated price than market price in 
order to pocket the difference when actual transaction is done. The moral 
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malpractice is likely to occur because the business actors have imperfect knowledge 
on behaviour of their business partners mainly due to information asymmetry in the 
study area.  In such circumstances the businesses feel safe to opt for market 
institutional arrangement rather than entering into contractual business arrangement. 
 
Geographical Distance to the Market 
Additional search and screening costs is incurred during transportation of the 
produces to the market. This is due to the reason that most producers carry the birds 
with them when searching for buyers. The more distant the farmers are from the 
market the greater the likelihood of incurring more search and screening risks 
resulting from opportunism particularly when it is done by an agent or sale 
representative. Geographical distance to the market prevents effective monitoring of 
the business partner or agent on search for customers – making the search and 
screening exercises to involve high transaction risks. 
 
 Analysis of the Determinants of Total Transaction Cost 
The analysis employed linear regression model (equation 2) in investigating factors 
determining total transaction costs (TTC); and establishing elasticity of each of the 
independent variables. As indicated in the previous section,, the dependent variable 
in this model is TTC. The independent variables are hypothesised to include: search 
and screening transaction costs, negotiation costs, monitoring and enforcement 
costs; and choice of IA1. The choice of IA1 variable is included in the model 
because in theory, the option for a PFB to enter into IA1 entails an increase in 
transaction costs as the firm becomes isolated instead of operating in an alliance or 
contractual arrangement. The TTC has the following hypothesized functional 
relationship with its independent variables: 
 
Where: TTC = Total transaction costs 
               X1 = transaction total search and screening costs 
               X2 = transaction total negotiation costs 
               X3 = transaction total monitoring and enforcement costs 
               IA1 = choice of IA1 
 
The model (equation 6) was estimated using survey data presented in Table 5. A 
backward regression technique was employed in estimating the model. In principle 
the method eliminates over-fitted variables (in a model) sequentially depending on 
strength of each variable. Table 7 summarizes the regression output of the 
regression analysis; it indicates that Model 2 is parsimonious TTC model because it 
has all the variable parameters statistically significant (P < 0.05). It shows also, that 
the choice for IA1 variable was eliminated in the model. This implies that, the 
variable was too weak to be included in the TTC equation – it was an unreliable 
variable. 
 
Prior to interpretation of the model, a test of presence of multicolineality threat was 
conducted. The diagnosis was done using the Valiance Inflation Factor (VIF).  
Basically, the VIF shows how the variance of an estimator is inflated by presence of 
multicolineality (Gujarat, 2003). As a rule of thumb if VIF of a variable exceed 4 it 
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warrants further investigation of the variable, while if VIF exceed 10, it indicates 
presence of serious multicolineality. The SPSS results in Table 7 show that the VIFs 
for all the variables in the model were very small (VIF < 4). After it was confirmed 
that there was no threat of multicolinerity, the model parameters were used in 
interpreting variables of the model. 
 














(Constant) -510.35 142.285  0.00   
Search Costs 1.009 0.003 0.596 0.00 0.880 1.14 
Negotiation Costs 1.006 0.005 0.437 0.00 0.984 1.02 
Enforcement 
Costs 
1.001 0.004 0.486 0.00 0.885 1.13 
1 
Choice for IA1 -14.595 157.636 0.000 0.93 0.984 1.02 
(Constant) -513.80 136.901  0.00   
 Search Costs 1.009 0.003 0.596 0.00 0.882 1.13 




1.001 0.004 0.486 .000 0.890 1.12 
 
The econometric results indicate that there was a positive and significant 
relationship between TTC and all of its three reliable independent variables.  The 
regression parameters show that a 100 percent increase in search and screening cost 
increases TTC by 59.6percent. That is an increase in for example, time spent 
waiting for buyers or travel expenses to potential buyers when searching for buyers 
results into an increase of total transaction cost by more than a half of the prevailing 
costs. The results show also that a 100 percent increase in negotiation cost increases 
TTC by 43.7 percent. It implies that an increase for example in time spent 
bargaining, amount of money paid to an agent and cost of legal advice on arbitration 
increases total transaction costs to nearly a half of the existing one.  The 
econometric results show in addition that, an increase in monitoring and 
enforcement costs by 100 percent increases TTC by 48.6 percent. This shows that 
an increase in costs due to for example, increase in fees for hiring lawyers during 
business disputes, expenditure on visits to inspect progress of sale or costs to 
maintain of good relationship with the creditor, increases total transaction costs to 
nearly a half of the existing one.  
 
The regression coefficients indicate that TTC is relatively more responsive to 
changes in search and screening cost than it is with the other two independent 
variables.  It shows also that it is not responsive to decisions by business firms to 
change their organization structure say form IA1 to IA2 or the reverse. It follows 
therefore that, given the prevailing institutional environment, level of uncertainty 
and opportunism; a shift of PFB from independent business entity arrangement to 
contractual business arrangement has no impact on reduction of TTC. One of the 
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informants summarized the impact of increase of enforcement cost and of 
negotiation cost as compared to search cost as follows: 
 ‘An increase in monitoring and enforcement costs including for example 
cost of hiring lawyers during business disputes and expenditure on visits to 
inspect progress of sale have little impact on increase on total transaction 
costs. This is because PFBs rarely sell their products on credit terms – they 
mainly sell on cash terms. Similarly, an increase in negotiation cost due to, 
for example, increase ontime spent bargaining, cannot increase transaction 
risks very much  because the business actor can bargain sale price while 
doing other business activities. They as well rarely use formal legal 
institutions to settle business disputes and therefore an increase in costs of 
legal advice on arbitration cannot increase transaction risks very much’. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The paper shows in summary that, decision by business firms to opt for independent 
business arrangement or enter into contractual business arrangements depends on 
relative magnitude of transaction risks. The businesses choose an arrangement 
which is perceived to have relatively lower transaction risks than the alternative. 
Most of the PFBs in the study area perceive that contractual business arrangement is 
relatively more risky due to existence of high opportunistic behaviour among 
business actors and high uncertainty (behaviour and environmental); which is 
accompanied with weak legal institutional framework. The business firms opt for 
market institutional arrangement in order to avoid the transaction risks. The 
discussion shows also that, search and screening cost is the greatest contributing 
factor on decisions by the PFBs to opt for market institutional arrangement rather 
than entering into contractual business arrangements. It is followed by monitoring 
and enforcement cost; and negotiation cost shows to have the lowest impact on the 
decisions. Policy intervention should therefore be focused on reducing search and 
screening cost followed by enforcement cost; and then negotiation cost in 
descending order of preference. 
 
In regards to elasticity the paper shows, that total transaction cost (TTC) is 
relatively more responsive to changes in search and screening costs than other 
independent variables. More specifically, an increase in search and screening cost 
has greater effect on increasing TTC than an increase in other factors determining 
TTC. This is followed by enforcement cost and the negotiation cost has a relatively 
lowest elasticity. The paper indicates also that, given the prevailing institutional 
environment the decision by individual business firms to shift from operating as 
independent business entities in market institutional arrangement to contractual 
business arrangement have no impact on reduction of TTC.  The empirical result 
showed in addition that, decision by PFBs to enter into contractual business 
arrangement or otherwise is not a reliable determinant of total transaction cost.  This 
suggests therefore that policies to encourage farm business firms to enter into 
contractual business arrangement have zero impact on reducing total transaction 
cost. Policy implication in this matter therefore is that, with the prevailing weak  
institutional environment in the country, TTC can be reduced and therefore 
stimulate growth of the PFBs, by instituting measures to reduce the main 
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components of transaction costs rather than encouraging producers to enter into 
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